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A paradigm shift

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A paradigm shift

Hotels need to put measures in place to counter terror attacks, and to invest better in beefing up their security and surveillance systems, says Omer Laviv.

I am a frequent user of hotels. As an experienced traveller, who also regularly advises hotels regarding their security, I hope that you will believe me when I say hotel security needs a serious re-thinking.

Hotels are not designed with high levels of security in mind: they are designed to provide accommodation to the traveller, they emphasise comfort and aesthetics rather than safety and security features – most of all, they are not designed to confront terror.

Well, apparently we have reached a point in which this concept has to change. Hotels are practically the ultimate target – minimal security measures, large volume of people in one location, and a fixed location.

It is clear that, while there are numerous attack tactics used by terrorists, some are more likely to be practised than others:

  1. Explosives – these are either vehicle born improvised explosive device (VBIED) or improvised explosive device (IED), as in explosives belts, carried by a suicide bomber. Once the explosives are positioned at the site, there is very little security forces can do to prevent the explosion (there are things to be done to limit the damage, though).
  2. Para-military units – it is possible that the Mumbai terror attack signalled a new trend, where a group of ten terrorists were using guns, grenades, and IEDs to create damage at several sites. Their most impressive success was the capability to prolong the attack (three days), getting a worldwide, “A” class rating in all news media.

The unfortunate success of the Mumbai attackers suggests that we should be prepared for more attacks of this sort, including armed attacks, assassinations, and kidnapping, at hotels.

Security forces around the world pinpoint suicide bombing as their number one problem. The best preventive measure is intelligence gathering, but this is the responsibility of the state, not the hotel’s security.

Hotel security measures should focus on deterrence (awareness, perimeter control), and on preventing the terrorist from entering the hotel premises, thus making him explode in a less preferred place and hopefully creating lesser damage.

VBIED attacks have their drawbacks that security forces can, and should, use. Good security measures at the perimeter should create problems for terrorists to enter the hotel’s perimeter with VBIED.

Such was the case at the Marriott in Islamabad, where vehicle barriers forced the VBIED to be detonated at a distance from the hotel, and many lives were saved by that.

Para-military groups create a different kind of problem to hotel security. I might also add, as clearly shown in the Mumbai attack case study, that sometimes, even the local law-enforcement unit is not ready to counter such an attack.

This situation has to change. Hotel management should put in place technologies and measures to counter the preliminary stages of such an attack. In addition, hotels should invest more in equipping, training, vetting, and recruiting skilled personnel.

One of the main reasons for casualties in a bombing which occurs within a hotel’s public areas (such as the lobby) comes from shattered glass pieces flying all over. This threat can be reduced by using special window frames and materials. It might cost more, but studies show that it is eventually cost-effective.

Any security solution for hotels should be in line with deterrence, that is, making the hotel more difficult to attack.

Such measures can be screening of vehicles and guests, perimeter control (24/7 camera surveillance, control room, gates, barriers, and fences).

Security staff should be able to detect abnormal behavior, to recognise surveillance and counter-surveillance techniques, to respond to, and report about suspicious events, and to react timely, when an attack occurs.

Most of all, they have to have the right attitude of awareness – they should think, and act, as security officers, and not as other service providers in the hotel.

The first step for the hotel management is assessing the current level of the hotel’s security. This should be done by conducting a TVRA (Threat, Vulnerability, and Risk Assessment) to identify vulnerabilities and to rate the risk level associated to those vulnerabilities.

There are some security measures which are always recommended, such as vetting and security awareness of the entire hotel staff; employing surveillance teams; installing surveillance technologies; replacing ordinary windows with protective glass; conducting vehicle and guest security screening as far as possible from the hotel entrance; improving collaboration and communication with the local law enforcement agency; increasing the number of visible security officers as also using undercover agents; minimising entry points to the perimeter and to the hotel itself; and keeping a control over the entry gates.

Hotels today should realise that their guests expect to be safe and secure when staying with them. This is going to become more important than the level of comfort offered; there are already information providers that rate and measure every hotel service, including security levels. Hotel security is a serious business, and it calls for serious treatment.

The knowledge exists, and there is no reason why guests should not have first-class security, along with all the other services hotels provide.